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We know that it really mattered to Justice Hugo Black. As he made
clear in his famous dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California] Black
was convinced that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
apply the complete protection of the Bill of Rights to the states.2 And, as
he also made plain in his Adamson dissent, he was equally convinced
that working with the "specific" or "explicit" guarantees of the first
Eight Amendments would furnish Americans more protection than
would applying the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
I. How MANAGEABLE IS THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS TEST?
Justice Black underscored the importance of "courts proceeding
within 4[the] clearly marked constitutional boundaries" of the Bill of
Rights. He disparaged working with the generalities of the Fourteenth
Amendment as courts "roam[ing] at will in the limitless area of their
own beliefs as to reasonableness. 5  The famous (or should one say,
infamous) "stomach pumping" case, Rochin v. California,6 gave Black
another opportunity to voice his unhappiness with the due process
approach.
Concurring in the result, Justice Black rejected the notion that the
appropriate inquiry was whether-as Justice Felix Frankfurter, speaking
for the majority, had put it-the police conduct in this case (a) "shocks
the conscience," 7 (b) "offend[s] 'a sense of justice,' 8 (c) "is bound to
offend even hardened sensibilities," 9 or (d) fails to "respect certain
decencies of civilized conduct."' 0 The Court, maintained Black, should
have asked, rather, whether the police conduct violated the "explicit"
1. 332 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
2. See id at 71-72.
3. See id at 89. See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952) (Black,
J., concurring).
4. Id. at 91-92.
5. Id. at 92.
6. 342 U.S. 165, 174-79 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 172 (majority opinion).
8. Id. at 173.
9. Id. at 172.
10. Id. at 173.
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language of the Fifth Amendment, which forbids any person in any
criminal case from being "compelled ... to be a witness against
himself."' 1
The unruliness of the Due Process approach is underscored by the fact
that shortly after he wrote the majority opinion in Rochin, throwing out
the evidence, Justice Frankfurter wrote an angry dissent in Irvine v.
California,2 protesting the Court's decision to admit the evidence. In
Irvine the police made repeated illegal entries into petitioner's home,
first to install a secret microphone and then to move it to the bedroom, in
order to listen to the conversation of the occupants-for over a month.
(Surely I am not the only one who, if forced to choose the lesser of these
two evils, would choose Rochin's experience with the police rather than
Irvine's).
Astonishingly, Justice Robert Jackson, who announced the judgment
of the Court in Irvine and wrote the principal opinion, conceded that
"few police measures have come to our attention that more flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle declared
by the Fourth Amendment as a restriction on the Federal Government."'
3
Nevertheless, "[h]owever obnoxious... the facts..., they do not involve
coercion, violence or brutality to the person."'14 It was clear to dissenting
Justice Frankfurter, however, that the "aggravating" and "repulsive"
police conduct that had occurred in the case put it squarely in the Rochin
category.15
II. How SPECIFIC ARE THE SPECIFIC GUARANTEES OF THE
BILL OF RIGHTS?
If the Due Process approach often turns out to be a murky, spongy
test, is resorting to the so-called explicit language of the first Eight
Amendments much better? How helpful-how "clearly marked"' -
does the explicit language of the Bill of Rights prove to be when specific
problems arise under a particular clause? Take, for example, the
accused's Sixth Amendment right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defense."
11. See id. at 174-75 (Black, J., concurring).
12. 347 U.S. 128, 139-42 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 132 (majority opinion).
14. Id. at 133.
15. Id. at 145 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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When does the right to counsel begin? When a person is indicted?
When he or she is taken to the police station? When, to quote Escobedo
v. Illinois,17 "the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when
its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession"?
1 8
How far does the right to appointed counsel go? Does it apply to
misdemeanor cases as well as felony cases? Does it apply to appeals as
well as trials? Should we require court-appointed lawyers to handle
indigent defendants' appeals even though the lawyers are convinced that
their clients' appeals lack any merit? Should an indigent probationer or
parolee at a revocation hearing be provided with counsel?
When judges hammer out the answers to such questions (as they have
done, rightly or wrongly, over many years), do the so-called "specific"
or "clearly marked" guarantees of the Bill of Rights enable them to
avoid injecting their own notions of decency and justice into the
language of the Bill of Rights? I think not.
Why so? Because when a particular issue arises all too frequently the
oft-called specific language of the first Eight Amendments turns out to
be insufficiently specific-indeed sometimes not much clearer than the
generalities of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. 19
More than forty years ago, Judge Henry Friendly warned that "[t]here
is grave risk of self-delusion in the reiterated references to the
declarations of fundamental principles in the Bill of Rights as
17. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
18. Id. at 492. On recently rereading Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code
of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1965), written on the eve of Miranda, I
was struck by how concerned Judge Friendly was "that the Court may hold the assistance
of counsel clause of the sixth amendment to require exclusion of admissions to
policemen on the street or freely made after arrival at the station house, unless counsel
was present or the right to counsel had been clearly waived." Id. at 941. See also
Arnold Enker & Sheldon Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47, 60-61 (1964), voicing apprehension that the
Warren Court might be in the process of shaping "a novel right not to confess except
knowingly and with the tactical assistance of counsel."
As it turned out, Miranda does not go that far. The police may advise suspects of their
rights, not defense lawyers, and counsel need not be present when the police do give the
Miranda warnings. Moreover, the warnings need not be given unless the suspect is both
(a) in custody (which is rarely the case when suspects are on the street or in their cars)
and (b) about to be interrogated.
19. As Professor Farber and Sherry have recently reminded us, DANIEL A. FARBER
& SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS 77 (2009), James Madison once observed that
"[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest
and most mature deliberation are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be ... ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."
To quote Farber and Sherry again, id. at 22, "[a]s anyone who has served on a document
drafting committee knows, the final product represents various compromises, often deliberately
evading particularly sensitive questions or adopting positions that command no support
but also spark no opposition."
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'specifics."' 20 More then fifty years ago-at a time when the Warren
Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure had not yet gotten
underway-Professor Sanford Kadish observed:
The changing contours of and the vigorous divisions of the Court concerning
the meaning of and freedom from religion, double jeopardy, cruel and unusual
punishments, the privilege against self-incrimination and unreasonable searchers and
seizures, belie the notion that the literal language of these provisions directs and
confines judicial inquiry along specific lines.
The shift from a due process broadly conceived to one tied to the Bill of
Rights... is hardly a triumph of fixed meanings over flexible ones.
21
III. How HELPFUL IS THE EXPLICIT LANGUAGE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION AGAINST COMPELLED
SELF-INCRIMINATION?
That focusing on the "specific guarantees" of the Bill of Rights can
turn out to be most unrewarding is demonstrated by two cases involving
the taking of a blood sample from a person suspected of drunken
driving. One, Breithaupt v. Abram,22 was decided some years before the
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment "incorporated" the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. 3 The other case, Schmerber v.
California,24 was handed down two years after "incorporation" of the
privilege had taken place. To put it mildly, the "incorporation" of the
privilege did not affect the outcome.
Because Breithaupt was decided at a time when the protections of the
Fourteenth Amendment were not deemed to embrace the Fifth
Amendment privilege, that case summarily rejected the argument that
the Fifth Amendment privilege protected the defendant. But in
Schmerber--decided at a time when the Fifth Amendment was deemed
to apply to the states in its entirety-the Court rejected an argument
based on the Fifth Amendment privilege fairly easily:
20. Friendly, supra note 18, at 937.
21. Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A
Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 339 (1957).
22. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
23. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
24. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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[The] privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against
himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature, and [the] withdrawal of blood and the use of the analysis
in question in this case did not involve compulsion to these ends.
25
Justice Black, joined by Douglas, dissented in Schmerber (as both had
in Breithaupt), expressing amazement at the majority's conclusion
that-
compelling a person to give his blood to help the State convict him is not
equivalent to compelling him to be a witness against himself...26
The sole purpose of this project.. . was to obtain "testimony" from some
person to prove that petitioner had alcohol in his blood at the time he was
arrested. And the purpose of the project was certainly "communicative" in that
the analysis of the blood was to supply information to enable a witness to
communicate to the court and jury that petitioner was more or less drunk.27
It is a strange hierarchy of values that allows the State to extract a human
being's blood to convict him of a crime because of the blood's content but
proscribes compelled production of his lifeless papers.
28
Chief Justice Warren, who had dissented in Breithaupt (relying on
Rochin), dissented again in Schmerber. He deemed it sufficient to
reiterate the views he had expressed in Breithaupt.29 Five of the six
Justices who had voted with the majority in Breithaupt were still on the
Court when Schmerber was decided. They all voted with the majority.30
To use language from Justice Black's dissent in Adamson in a way he
would probably disapprove, would it be fair to say of Schmerber that,
although both the dissenters and the members of the majority may have
read the applicable language in the Bill of Rights, they provided their
"own concepts of decency and fundamental justice"'3' and "their own
beliefs as to reasonableness"?
32
25. Id. at 761.
26. Id. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 774.
28. Id. at 775.
29. See id. at 772 (majority opinion).
30. The only change in the voting was caused by newly appointed Justice Abe Fortas.
He dissented, maintaining, inter alia, that "petitioner's privilege against self-incrimination
applies." Id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
31. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 92.
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A year after Schmerber was decided, the Court handed down a famous
33lineup case, United States v. Wade. It was also a case that raised some
interesting self-incrimination issues. Mr. Wade, a suspect in a bank
robbery, had been placed in a lineup in which each person (a) wore strips
of tape on his face (as the robber had allegedly done) and (b) as
instructed to do so by the police, said something like "put the money in
the bag" (the words allegedly uttered by the robber).34 The most
troublesome self-incrimination issue was compelling the lineup
participants to speak "put the money in the bag."
A 5-4 majority, per Brennan, J., author of Schmerber, ruled that the
police had not violated the privilege against self-incrimination because
the privilege "'. . . offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting, photography, or measurements, to write or speak for
identification .. ., to assume a stance .. ., or to make a particular gesture." 
35
As for being compelled to say something like "put the money in the
bag," this, too, did not amount to a violation of the privilege because Mr.
Wade had only been "required to use his voice as an identifying physical
characteristic, not to speak his guilt.
36
Dissenting Justice Black reiterated the views set forth in his Schmerber
dissent. It seemed "quite plain" to him that-
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause was designed to bar the
Government from forcing any person to supply proof of his own crime,
precisely what Schmerber was forced to do when he was forced to supply his
blood... So here, the Government forced [Wade] to stand in a lineup, wear strips
on his face, and speak certain words, in order to make it possible for government
witnesses to identify him as a criminal.
37
Although not entirely clear, Black appears to have taken the position
that even if Mr. Wade had not been required to speak the words the
robber was supposed to have used, the police conduct still would have
been objectionable. He seemed to say that forcing a person to stand in a
lineup and/or wear strips on his face without more would have been
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment guarantee.
33. 388 U.S. 218 (1967). Wade held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a
defendant the right to counsel at a critical pretrial proceeding such as a lineup
identification.
34. See id. at 220.
35. Id. at 223 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764).
36. Id. at 222-23.
37. Id. at 245.
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On the other hand, the only feature of the identification proceeding
Justice Fortas objected to was requiring the lineup participants to speak
the words the robber was supposed to have uttered. 8 Schmerber,
maintained Fortas, was distinguishable; the police in the instant case had
gone a good deal further:
[The] accused may not be compelled in a lineup to speak the words uttered by
the person who committed the crime.... It is more than passive, mute assistance to
the eyes of the victim or of witnesses. It is the kind of volitional act-the kind of
forced cooperation by the accused-which is within the historical perimeter of
the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
39
... Schmerber ... authorized the forced extraction of blood from the veins of an
unwilling human being, [but it] did not compel the person actively to cooperate
-to accuse himself by a volitional act which differs only in degree from compelling
him to act out the crime, which, I assume, would be rebuffed by the Court. 40
For our purposes we need not resolve the disagreement over the
meaning and scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. Suffice to
say that in Wade, too, the so-called specificity of a provision of the Bill
of Rights did not afford the accused any more protection than would
have the generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment. And here, too, the
so-called specificity of a Bill of Rights guarantee did not prevent the
Court from splitting badly over its meaning.
IV. WHY LIBERALS FAVOR THE "INCORPORATION" OF THE
FIRST EIGHT AMENDMENTS
A primary reason many liberals favor the Fourteenth Amendment's
"incorporation" of the Bill of Rights is that because in some notable
instances the Court has read a particular provision of the Bill of Rights
generously or expansively before deciding whether to apply that
provision to the states. Thus it read the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure to require the exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of that guarantee 4 1 half a century before it
applied that guarantee in its entirety to the states. 4' And it interpreted
the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel to require the
38. Fortas's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. Id.
at 259 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 260.
40. Id. at 261.
41. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398-99 (1914).
42. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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appointment of counsel in those instances where a criminal defendant
could not afford to hire a lawyer43 a 4uarter-century before applying that
provision in its entirety to the states.
But this is hardly a tribute to the specificity or clarity of the Fourth
and Sixth Amendments. The Fourth Amendment only entitles people to
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. It has nothing to
say about admitting or excluding evidence obtained in violation of its
command. And it would be hard to argue that the Founding Fathers
contemplated an exclusionary rule.45
The Sixth Amendment has nothing to say about assigned or appointed
counsel. It speaks only of the accused's rights "to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense." Moreover, as a matter of history, the Court that
construed the Sixth Amendment to require the appointment of counsel
seems to have gotten it wrong. As a leading commentator on the right to
counsel has recently noted, "it seems highly probable that the Sixth
Amendment was designed to grant a legal representative of one's own
choosing," thereby rejecting the restricted British approach, "but no right
to have counsel provided by the government.
' 46
The view that all the "specific guarantees" of the Bill of Rights are
binding on the states is not helpful when the Supreme Court has not yet
told us what the particular guarantee means for the federal government,
i.e., when the Court is deciding how the guarantee applies to the states
and the federal government at the same time. This was the situation
when it came to Miranda.
To be sure, Malloy v. Hogan47 had announced that the privilege
against self-incrimination applied to the states in its entirety. But what
this meant was not at all clear. For example, did the privilege apply to
the interrogation room in state or federal cases?
43. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).
44. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
45. See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND
ORIGINAL MEANING 770-72 (2009); THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 609-28 (2008); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 5-26 (4TH ed. 2004) and authorities collected
therein.
46. JAMES TOMKOVICZ, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 21 (2002).
This view is strengthened by the fact that at the time the Nation ratified the Constitution,
not a single state guaranteed the right to appointed counsel. See id at 11-13. See also
DONALD A. DRIPPs, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND
FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 117 (2003).
47. 378 U.S. at 3.
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The prevailing view was that it did not. The reason often given was
that interrogation did not involve any kind of judicial process for the
taking of testimony. Thus, in none of the dozens of federal or state
confession cases decided in the decades before Miranda had the privilege
been the basis for deciding the admissibility of confessions--certainly
not as the privilege applied to judicial proceedings.48
True, a person brought into the interrogation room for questioning is
threatened neither with perjury for testifying falsely nor contempt for
refusing to testify at all. But (at least until Miranda was handed down)
did not many custodial suspects assume--or were they not led to believe
-that there were legal (or, for that matter extralegal) sanctions for
"refusing to cooperate" with the authorities? That did not seem to matter.
Since the police had no legal authority to make a suspect answer their
questions, the argument ran, the suspect had no legal obligation to
answer to which a privilege in the technical sense could apply.4 9
"The theory that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Bill of
Rights," Professor Donald Dripps points out in a paper he has written for
this conference, "established the foundation for the Warren Court's
'criminal procedure revolution."' 50 That may be, but as noted above, the
Warren Court's most famous criminal procedure case, Miranda, did not
"incorporate" any existing general understanding that the privilege
applies to custodial interrogation in federal cases. Indeed, the prevailing
view was that it did not. That is why, dissenting in Miranda, Justice
White could say that the majority opinion "has no significant support in
the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment"
51
V. COULD THE COURT HAVE WRITTEN MIRANDA WITHOUT RELYING
ON THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST
COMPELLED SELF-INCRIMINATION (OR THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL)?
As everybody is now aware, Miranda did hold that the privilege
applies to custodial interrogation and that "without proper safeguards"
(the Miranda warnings or "other procedures which are at least as
48. See generally YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 59-63
(1980); LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 82-83, 223-32
(1959); WALTER SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 16-18 (1967); 8 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 329 n.27 (Mc Naughton rev. 1961).
49. See supra note 48.
50. Donald J. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the
(First) Criminal Procedure Revolution Conference on the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 469 (2009).
51. 384 U.S. at 526 (White J., joined by Harlan and Stewart, IJ., dissenting).
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effective") 52 "the process of in-custody interrogation... contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to
resist and to compel him to speak ....
But did the Miranda Court have to rely so heavily on the "incorporated"
privilege against compelled self-incrimination? I venture to say it did
not have to rely on the privilege at all.
As Donald Dripps points out, on the eve of Miranda it was "quite
clear" that the Warren Court "was engaged in an extraordinary project;
not just to resolve some difficult cases, but to establish general rules to
guide police and lower courts in handling confessions." 54 But suppose at
the time Miranda was decided the Fourteenth Amendment had not
"incorporated" the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Could
the Court have reached essentially the same result it did in Miranda by
traveling down other roads?
For one thing, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would have been
available. In fact, on the eve of Miranda that seemed to be where the
Court was going. Indeed some years later, the lawyer who argued the
case for Mr. Miranda in the Supreme Court confessed that he and his
colleagues had decided that the Miranda briefs "should be written with
the entire focus on the Sixth Amendment [right to counsel] because that
is where the Court was headed after Escobedo. 55
52. Id. at 467 (majority opinion).
53. 384 U.S. at 467. See also id. at 461:
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by
antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described [in
various police manuals quoted earlier in the opinion] cannot be otherwise than
under compulsion to speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the
isolated setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or other
official investigations, where there are often impartial observers to guard
against intimidation or trickery.
54. Dripps, supra note 46, at 78.
55. John J. Flynn, Panel Discussion on the Exclusionary Rule, 61 F.R.D. 259, 278
(1972). Then, added Mr. Flynn, "in the very first paragraph [of the Miranda opinion]
Chief Justice Warren said, 'It is the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that is at issue
today.' That was Miranda's effective use of counsel." Flynn's reference is to Escobedo
v. Illinois, supra note 17.
The Miranda Court probably switched from a "right to counsel" base to a self-incrimination
base because a right to counsel approach seemed to have almost no "stopping point." If
the Court had adopted the view that once a suspect became "the accused" or the "focal
point," the right to counsel was triggered, even the admissibility of "volunteered" statements
might be threatened. On the other hand, the reach of the privilege against self-incrimination
was limited by the need for the suspect's statement to be "compelled." This may explain
why, dissenting in Escobedo v. United States, 378 U.S. at 497 (White, J., dissenting), three
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In Escobedo, the most recent pre-Miranda confession case-and up to
that point in time the most significant one-the Court had told us that
when Mr. Escobedo had been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer "the investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 'an
unsolved crime' and the suspect had become the accused.56 The Escobedo
Court concluded its opinion with the comment that it was "hold[ing]
only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-
when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a
confession--our adversary system begins to operate and, under the
circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his
lawyer.57
To be sure, "the circumstances here" were that after being taken to
police headquarters for questioning, Mr. Escobedo had made several
unsuccessful requests to see his lawyer and his lawyer, who was
elsewhere in the building, had made several unsuccessful efforts to see
his client. But there is sweeping language in the Court's opinion that
would have enabled it to say in the next confession case that once a
suspect is brought to the station house for questioning that in and of
itself makes him "the accused" or "the focal point," triggering certain
rights.5 8
If Miranda had rested on a right to counsel base rather than a self-
incrimination one, the first of the now familiar warnings might have to
be revised, but the basic message would be the same. The revised
warning might read something like this: We cannot make you answer
any questions we ask; police officers have no lawful authority to compel
any answers.
The other warnings could remain the same. Whether or not the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination applies in its entirety to the states,
any statements custodial suspects make to a police officer can (and will)
be used against them in a court of law and they should be told that. As
critics of the right to counsel approach to confessions, Justice White, joined by Clark and
Stewart, JJ., turned to the privilege as a less restrictive alternative:
It is incongruous to assume that the provision for counsel in the Sixth Amendment
was meant to amend or supersede the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth
amendment, which is now applicable to the States. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1.
That amendment addresses itself to the very issue of incriminating admissions
of an accused and resolves it by prescribing only compelled statements.
56. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 485 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 492.
58. On the other hand, the Court could have limited the reach of the right to counsel
approach in one respect, thereby removing a major objection to this approach (see the
discussion in notes 18 and 55 supra), by making it clear that under the "focal point" test
"volunteered" statements would still be admissible, i.e., the custodial suspect would only
become "the accused" or "the focal point" when he was questioned by the police.
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for the remaining two warnings, they deal with the right to retained and
appointed counsel.
Suppose that on the eve of the Miranda case neither the Fifth
Amendment privilege nor the Sixth Amendment right to counsel were
deemed applicable to the states. Still another route remained open-the
old due process/"voluntariness"/totality-of-the circumstances test.
59
If, as seems to have been the state of affairs at the time of Miranda, a
majority of the Court had become (a) frustrated by its "inability to
articulate a clear and predictable definition of 'voluntariness,
' ' 60
(b) disheartened by "the apparent persistence of state courts in utilizing
the ambiguity of the [voluntariness] concept to validate confessions of
doubtful constitutionality," 61 and (c) determined to replace the prevailing
test for the admissibility of confessions with a more meaningful and
manageable one, I very much doubt that the five Justices who made up
the Miranda majority would have allowed the inaccessibility of the
"specific language" of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to have thwarted
them. Instead, I believe, the Justices would have turned to the old
"voluntariness" test and reinforced it, making it a more protective test.
For example, the Court might have said, after discussing the "interrogation
environment" at considerable length (which it actually did do in
Miranda), that "coercion" is present in any police interrogation of a
person taken into custody, no matter how brief the questioning. Or it
59. Quite recently a leading commentator on police interrogation and confessions
has maintained that "it would do some good to abolish Miranda's warning and waiver
requirements. At a minimum, it could clear the way for full assessments of voluntariness,
without false reliance on warnings and waivers." Charles Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda,
96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1596 (2008). 1 hasten to add that I disagree.
Ever since the Warren Court disbanded, subsequent Courts, with a few exceptions,
have weakened Miranda in many ways. At the very least, most of the Justices have shown
little or no unhappiness with these developments. Professor Weisselberg voices "hope
for meaningful development of the voluntariness doctrine." Id. at 1599. But what basis
is there for such hope? Why would a Court that has experienced the decline of Miranda
and done little or nothing to resuscitate it want to fortify the voluntariness test so
custodial suspects would receive greater protection?
Four decades ago we had a very different Supreme Court-one that was greatly
concerned about the many inadequacies of the prevailing test for the admissibility of
confessions (the due process/ "voluntariness" test) and determined to do something about
it. If that Court had been unable to base a new approach to police interrogation and
confessions on a Fifth or Sixth Amendment right, it might very well have proceeded by
invigorating the "voluntariness" test. But why would the current Court do so?
60. Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT.
REV. 99, 102.
61. Id.
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might have said that any incriminating statement obtained from someone
subjected to the "interrogation environment" must be deemed "involuntary."
And it might have added (to paraphrase what the Court actually did say
in Miranda) that unless adequate safeguards, such as warnings, were
utilized to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from someone in those surroundings could be
considered "voluntary."
By falling back on the "voluntariness" test and shoring it up, not only
could the Warren Court have reached essentially the same result it did in
Miranda, but it could have used much of the same language that appears
in the Miranda opinion. Consider, for example, the following language
from Miranda (with italicized and bolded language replacing the Court's
references to the privilege against self-incrimination):
Even without employing brutality, the "third degree" or the specific stratagems
described [in the policies interrogation manuals], the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals. 6
2
In each of the cases before us, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures...
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner...
The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles-that the terrible engine of the criminal law
is not to be used to overreach individuals who stand helpless against it and that
people taken into police custody are not to be exploited for the information
necessary to condemn them before the law.63
An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded
by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques of persuasion described
above cannot be otherwise than under great pressure to speak. As a practical
matter, the coercion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station may
well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.64
62. 384 U.S. at 455.
63. Cf 384 U.S. at 457-58. The italicized language is taken from Justice Frankfurter's
plurality opinion in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961) (excluding an
involuntary confession).
64. Cf id. at 461.
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We have concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
coercive pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and
to pressure him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.. 65
Therefore... unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
preventing police interrogators from pressuring or forcing custodial suspects
to speak, the following safeguards must be observed...
6 6
If, instead of turning to the specific guarantees of the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments, the Miranda Court had significantly strengthened the due
process/"voluntariness"/totality-of-the-circumstances test the now familiar
warnings would have needed to be revised. As discussed earlier, however,
the first two warnings could have been quite similar to those built on a
right to counsel base.
67
As for the other two warnings, it would not have been difficult for a
fortified "voluntariness" test to require Miranda-type right to counsel
warnings. After all, on the eve of Miranda whether a suspect had been
told he had the right to see a lawyer or whether his request to see a
lawyer had been honored or rebuffed were already factors to be weighed
in determining the voluntariness of a confession.6 8 If, at the time of
Miranda, five Justices had been bent on furnishing defendants
significantly more protection than the traditional "voluntariness" test
provided, and if for some reason the Fifth and Sixth Amendment routes
were blocked, the Justices would have had little difficulty achieving
their objective by building upon the "voluntariness" test and, inter alia,
making advice about the right to counsel and about compliance with
assertions of that right prominent features of a new, fortified voluntariness
test.
65. Cf id. at 467.
66. Cf id.
67. See the discussion in the text after note 58, supra.
68. See generally Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress "Overrule" Miranda?, 85
CORNELL L. REv. 883, 929-33 (2000).
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VI. THE ELASTICITY OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
If one had to choose between (a) a Fourteenth Amendment that
included all the "specific guarantees" of the first Eight Amendments but
nothing else, i.e., a Fourteenth Amendment that had no independent
function at all or (b) a Fourteenth Amendment that "incorporated" none
of the Bill of Rights provisions in their entirety but had an independent
potency-and thus could respond to "abuses [that] reveal themselves in
the course of time, 69 not just "those which had become manifest in
1791 "7 -which Fourteenth Amendment should one choose? It is fairly
clear, I believe, that Professor Dripps would choose the second version.
As he recently observed:
[Fidelity] to incorporation would have meant betraying instrumental reliability
concerns, prompting the Court (as we have seen) to compromise incorporation
to the point where the amendments lost most of their distinctive content. Due
process values ultimately determined the shape of doctrine; indeed it would be
considerably easier to derive Gideon, Miranda, and Terry from the due process
clause than from the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. Incorporation, however,
had the effect of confining the operation of due process values within the arbitrary
confines of the amendments. 7
1
At another point, Dripps charges that "Gideon's focus on the
constitutionality irrelevant language of the Sixth Amendment has crippled
serious scrutiny of how well counsel performs the constitutionally relevant
function of defending the accused. . . . [B]ecause each defendant has
'counsel'-no matter how overworked, inexperienced, lazy or incompetent-
the constitutional minima appear to be satisfied.,
72
Ake v. Oklahoma,73 Dripps tells us, "exemplifies the approach" he has
in mind.74 Ake held that when an indigent defendant has made a
preliminary showing that his sanity at the time the crime occurred is
likely to be a significant factor at trial, Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process requires a state to provide access to "the psychiatric examination
and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on the
defendant's mental condition."?7 Moreover, when, as in Ake, the state
69. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 67 (Frankfurther, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Dripps supra note 46, at 116.
72. Id. at 118.
73. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
74. Dripps, supra note 46, at 142.
75. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70.
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presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dangerousness at
a capital sentencing proceeding, the Fourteenth Amendment requires
access to psychiatric assistance. 76
Professor Dripps comments:
The Ake Court described the appropriate inquiry as to whether the defense has
access to "the basic tools" of an effective defense.... [I]t is an illuminating
comment on the power of doctrine that even a conservative majority could be
moved to order the expenditure of public funds when faced with the prospect
that a criminal trial ran a gratuitous risk of error, despite compliance with every
specific safeguard in the Bill of Rights.
77
I doubt that Ake is nearly as significant as Professor Dripps makes it
out to be. First of all, unlike the search and seizure exclusionary rule, or
even many Miranda cases, the Ake case went to the guilt or innocence of
a defendant (albeit an indigent one). Thus, even a police-friendly Justice
could be quite comfortable supporting the decision. Secondly, Dripps's
assertion that "there is nothing in the Bill of Rights [about] ... expert
witnesses" 78 is debatable.
It strikes me that it turns on what meaning one attributes to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. As long ago as 1942, the Supreme Court
ruled in a federal case that the Sixth Amendment was violated when
defendants were denied their "right to have the effective assistance of
counsel. 7 9
The great majority of lawyers are neither able nor trained to provide
psychiatric services. Nor is there any indication Mr. Ake's lawyer was
an exception. Has not a defendant (and a capital defendant to boot) who
is denied the services of a psychiatrist even though he has demonstrated
the need for one been deprived of an effective defense?
Judging from the opinion of the Court, the Ake majority was quite
distressed that Mr. Ake had been denied the assistance of a psychiatrist.80
Suppose the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the provisions of the
first Eight Amendments but nothing else. Suppose further that the Court
was convinced (to use the language it actually used in Ake) that-
76. See id. at 78-79.
77. Dripps, supra note 46, at 142.
78. Id. at 61.
79. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (emphasis added).
80. See text at note 81 infra.
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without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional examination on
issues relevant to the defense .... and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of
a State's psychiatric witness, the risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues
is extremely high... When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold
showing [that] his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the
need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent. It is in such cases
that a defense may be devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and
testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a reasonable chance
of success.
8 1
Does anybody really believe that having arrived at these conclusions
about the need for a psychiatrist in Ake-type circumstances, the Supreme
Court would have denied Mr. Ake the relief he sought because (a) legal
doctrine prevented the Justices from writing an opinion based on the
generalities of the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) legal doctrine prevented
them from resorting to the Sixth Amendment? I submit that legal
doctrine does not have that much power.
VII. WHY SOMETIMES THE GENERALITIES OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT HAVE A LIMITED REACH
Although the defendant gained the protection of Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process in Ake, she failed to do so in Lassiter v. Department of
Social Services.82 The question presented in Lassiter was whether an
indigent parent had an unqualified right to counsel in a parental
termination proceeding.
There are limits to the elasticity of the Sixth Amendment guarantees.
The Amendment applies in "all criminal prosecutions" and it would be
hard to argue that a proceeding to terminate parental rights is a
"prosecution." So Ms. Lassiter's only real hope was to avail herself of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.
Although a majority rejected Ms. Lassiter's argument, it did not deny
that few deprivations are more grievous than the loss of parental rights.
The loss, the Court recognized, is both total and irrevocable. 83 (Indeed, I
would go so far as to say that most people would rather be found guilty
of a criminal offense and incarcerated for thirty days (in which event, if
they were indigent, they would be provided counsel) 4 than lose permanent
custody of their children.) However, as dissenting Justice John Paul
81. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
82. 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981).
83. See id. at 39 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972).
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Stevens observed, "the Court appears to treat this case as though it
merely involved the deprivation of an interest in property that is less
worthy of protection than a person's liberty." 85
Ms. Lassiter made out a strong case for appointed counsel. The
majority, per Stewart, J., agreed that (1) the loss to the indigent parent is
quite serious, (2) the proceeding to terminate parental rights is quite
formal, (3) a parent's qualifications will frequently turn on psychiatric
testimony, which is difficult for most lay persons to comprehend and to
rebut, (4) the cost to the state of furnishing counsel in these proceeding
is relatively small, (5) every other state court that had addressed the
same question had decided it in favor of the indigent parent, and (6) a
long list of studies had urged adoption of the rule Ms. Lassiter was
seeking.8 6 Nevertheless, employing the Matthews v. Eldridge "balancing
test,' 87 the Court concluded that the Eldridge factors (the private interests at
stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedure used will
lead to erroneous decisions) did not suffice to rebut "the presumption
that an litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he
may be deprived of his physical liberty. 88
In Lassiter, the Court made an argument that I never expected it to
make again once the famous Gideon case8 9 had been decided. The
Lassiter Court maintained that "the case presented no specially
troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive," 90 and that
"the presence of counsel" for Ms. Lassiter "could not have made a
determinative difference." 91
85. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. See generally Jesse Choper & Yale Kamisar, The Lassiter Case: The Right to
Appointed Counsel in Parental Status Termination Proceedings, in JESSE CHOPER, YALE
KAMISAR & LAURENCE TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, 1980-
81 (1982) at 171-78.
87. The issue in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), was whether a worker
had a due process right to an evidentiary hearing before his social security disability
benefits were terminated on the ground that he was no longer disabled. After taking
various factors into account, such as the "private interest ... affected by the official
action," "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,"
and the "fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail," the Court concluded that due process did not require an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 335.
88. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27 (majority opinion).
89. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
90. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32.
91. Id. at 32-33.
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As I commented at the time Lassiter was decided:
I cringe a bit when a court says, as the Lassiter Court did-on the basis of a
record made without the assistance of counsel-that "the case presented no
specially troublesome points of law..." [A] record made without the assistance
of counsel cannot establish that. It can onlyfail to establish on its face that the
defendant was seriously disadvantaged. What does it prove that the record
reads well? How would it have read if the defendant had counsel? What facts
might have been uncovered if competent investigations had been made? What
defenses might have been advanced if competent legal research had been done?
We do not know-at least we cannot be sure. That was the trouble with the old
Betts rule.
92
I believe that the Court should have ruled that Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process afforded an indigent person in Ms. Lassiter's circumstances
an unqualified right to appointed counsel. The problem, I suspect, was
that too many members of the Court were concerned about where or how
to draw the line. Too many felt they were moving into uncharted waters.
If Ms. Lassiter had prevailed, would the next case have raised the
question whether in a child custody case growing out of a divorce action,
an indigent spouse has a right to appointed counsel? Or would the issue
in the next case be whether the state has to provide counsel in eviction
proceedings, when an indigent person is about to lose her house or
apartment?93 Concerns such as these, I venture to say, are why a majority
of the court did not invoke the generalities of Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process on behalf of Ms. Lassiter.
VIII. Do JURORS HAVE TO BE UNANIMOUS FOR THE
DEATH SENTENCE TO BE VALID?
As I was in the midst of writing this paper, the press reported that
some Georgia legislators were hard at work trying to eliminate the
requirement that state jurors have to be unanimous for a death sentence
to be valid. If these legislators were to prevail, Georgia would become
the only state to allow non-unanimous juries to sentence defendants to
death. 94 When asked to comment on this proposal, Professor Carol
Steiker is reported to have said that it might violate both Fourteenth
92. Choper & Kamisar, supra note 86, at 174-75. The reference is to Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the case that was overruled by Gideon.
93. Although these cases can be plausibly distinguished, see Choper & Kamisar,
supra note 86, at 177-78, 1 still believe they troubled the Court a great deal.
94. See Robbie Brown, In Georgia, Push to End Unanimity for Execution, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008, at A18.
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Amendment Due Process and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against "cruel and unusual punishments. 95
If Georgia does enact legislation requiring say, only nine jurors to vote
for the death sentence, the crucial issues will not be whether the Eighth
or Fourteenth Amendments (or both) govern the case. It will be rather
whether five or more Justices are strongly offended by Georgia's attempt
to make it easier for prosecutors to obtain the death penalty or are
convinced that the severity and finality of the death penalty make it so
unique that the states cannot dispense with juror unanimity.
If, in the hypothetical case posed, the defendant convinces five or
more Justices that the need to strike down the law is compelling, the
Court will not have much trouble finding the necessary legal doctrine to
write an opinion in his favor. On the other hand, if the defendant fails to
convince five or more Justices of the pressing need to invalidate the new
law, legal doctrine is not likely to be of much help to him.
95. Id.
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